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Abstract 
Australia has required all eligible electors to enrol (register) to vote now for one hundred 
years. In recent years, however, changing demographic patterns and citizen mobility have 
made it increasingly challenging to maintain the accuracy and currency of the federal 
electoral roll. These same social trends mean that strategies such as habitation reviews 
which have been successful in the past are no longer effective or feasible. Two of the 
state electoral commissions have responded to the declining enrolment rate by 
implementing systems in which administrative data from other agencies are used to add 
individuals to the roll and update their details without their intervention (direct enrolment 
and direct update). Recently passed Commonwealth legislation now allows the AEC to 
adopt similar processes. The current paper examines the processes by which the NSW 
and Victorian Electoral Commissions have implemented direct update and direct 
enrolment through previously published information and interviews with the commissions. 
The paper also reports on their progress so far, including the impact on the 2010 Victorian 
and 2011 NSW state elections. The implications of these reforms for electoral roll 
management in Australia generally are discussed. 
Introduction 
Federal direct update and direct enrolment legislation was passed in June 2012 and given 
Royal Assent on 24 July 2012 in response to the first two recommendations of the inquiry 
of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) into the 2010 election. The 
recommendations were that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (CEA) should be 
amended to allow the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to directly update and 
directly enrol eligible persons based on data or information that person had provided to an 
agency approved by the AEC. A similar recommendation was also contained in the report 
into the 2007 federal election (Recommendation 10).  
The purpose of this report is to examine the existing approaches to direct update and 
direct enrolment implemented by the electoral commissions of New South Wales (NSW) 
and Victoria. The report will cover both publically released information about the operation 
of direct enrolment and direct update in NSW and Victoria, and report on consultations 
with the NSW and Victorian electoral commissions focusing on the operation of their 
programs. The aim of the current research is to allow the AEC to better anticipate the 
likely impact of recent legislative change for federal direct update and direct enrolment on 
its business including consequential impacts on turnout and informality. The research will 
also assist the AEC in developing mitigation strategies to address any adverse impacts 
should they arise. 
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Background 
A brief history of enrolment in Australia 
The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 charges the AEC with the responsibility for 
maintaining the Commonwealth electoral roll. Each of the Australian states and territories 
has a Joint Roll Arrangement with the AEC, and the Commonwealth roll also forms the 
basis of each of the rolls used by the state and territory electoral commissions1. This has 
traditionally meant that Australians could complete one enrolment form and be enrolled for 
local, state and territory, and federal elections.  
Prior to 1999 the AEC updated the roll using habitation reviews, which involved door-
knocking of addresses across Australia’s states and territories to confirm enrolments 
(AEC 2005). Habitation reviews were time consuming (taking up to six months to 
complete) and expensive around $16 million in 1999 dollars), and occurred only once 
every two years. Changing residential patterns and increasing population mobility made 
periodic habitation reviews a less effective roll maintenance strategy (AEC 1999).  
In 1999 the AEC in conjunction with its joint roll partners, the state and territory electoral 
commissions, introduced a new process for updating the roll called Continuous Roll 
Update (CRU). CRU matches data obtained from various state and commonwealth 
government agencies against the roll to identify individuals who have moved or who might 
not be correctly enrolled. The AEC also has an address register of habitable addresses 
and can identify when there are no (or too many) electors enrolled at an address. When 
the data matching process identifies potential enrolment variations the individual is sent a 
letter and enrolment form asking them to confirm their new details (ECA 2005). The 
enrolment is not updated until the individual returns a signed enrolment form to the AEC 
or an objection action is commenced by the AEC (see below).   
The first iteration of CRU in 1999 involved the receipt of 600 000 change of address 
notifications from Australia Post. The response rate to the initial mail out was 32.3 per 
cent (ECA 1999). A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2001 into the integrity 
of the electoral roll found that CRU was an effective means of managing the roll and 
would provide a roll that was “highly accurate, complete and valid” (ANAO 2002, 13). Two 
years into the operation of CRU, ANAO found that while the process was beneficial, the 
data used for CRU was not consistent across states and territories.  
In 2004-05 4.1 million change of address and new potential elector records were received, 
primarily from Australia Post, Centrelink and motor vehicle licensing authorities. The 
                                               
1 In some cases the states will use the Commonwealth roll for their state as is, whereas in others 
the Commonwealth roll is one component of the state roll, amongst other information.  
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resulting 2.4 million letters from the AEC resulted in 1.4 million responses, a response rate 
of 55 per cent (ECA 2005). Following the recommendations of the 2002 ANAO report the 
AEC also undertook Sample Audit Fieldwork (SAF). The SAF exercise aimed to test the 
accuracy and completeness of the roll by doorknocking in 225 randomly selected Census 
Collection Districts (CCDs)2. The 2005 SAF  found enrolment participation at 98.4 per 
cent, enrolment completeness at 96.3 per cent, and enrolment accuracy at 91.1 per cent 
(AEC 2005). The positive results from the SAF appeared to validate the effectiveness of 
CRU, and SAF exercises undertaken in 2006, 2007 and 2009 produced comparable 
results (AEC 2011a). 
The CRU process has continued to be the primary means of updating the commonwealth 
roll, with 4.5 million letters sent in 2009-2010, and 33.7 per cent of all enrolments resulting 
from CRU letters (AEC 2011a). However response rates to CRU letters have declined 
over time. Current response rates to CRU letters are between 15 and 20 per cent (AEC 
2012), resulting in CRU gradually becoming a less effective way of keeping an up-to-date 
roll.  
In addition to generating enrolment letters, CRU can also result in individuals being 
removed from the roll. Section 114 of the CEA requires the AEC to begin objection action 
where there is reasonable grounds for believing that the person has not lived at the 
address for which they are enrolled for one month. If the response to the CRU letter 
indicates that the individual no longer lives at their enrolled address (such as a return to 
sender response) the AEC may send a notice indicating that if the individual does not 
respond they may be removed from the roll after 21 days (AEC 2012). As such, lack of 
response to the AEC’s letters may result in the individual losing their franchise.  
The CEA, as it stood until June 2012, required an individual to submit a signed enrolment 
form in order to enrol. CRU could identify individuals who were not enrolled, or who were 
enrolled at the wrong address, but the AEC could not do anything with this information 
other than notify the individual. Unless the individual took action to correct their enrolment, 
they risked being objected from the roll.  
The idea of using the same information as the CRU to enrol an individual or update their 
details without requiring the individual to take any action is not a new one. In the JSCEM 
report on the 2007 federal election the committee recommended that information received 
by the AEC be used to directly update the roll where the elector had specifically 
consented to their information to be used for that purpose (Recommendation 10). Directly 
enrolling electors was specifically recommended against (JSCEM 2009). The Australian 
Government’s 2009 Electoral Reform Green Paper also discussed “automatic enrolment” 
                                               
2 At the time the CCD was the smallest geographical area that the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
used for collecting statistics, and averages around 225 dwellings (less in rural areas).  
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and “automatic update”, and noted that the NSW Government was then examining these 
approaches as part of their SmartRoll project. The history of the NSW SmartRoll is 
outlined in more detail below.  
In late 2009 the Special Minister of State asked JSCEM to examine the NSW 
Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment (Automatic Enrolment) Bill 2009, the 
legislation enabling NSW’s SmartRoll process. In its submission to the inquiry the AEC 
stated that direct enrolment and update were “positive initiatives from the perspective of 
facilitating enrolment” (AEC 2010, 2). The AEC reiterated its support for direct enrolment 
and direct update in its submission to the JSCEM inquiry into the 2010 federal election 
(AEC 2011a). A majority of the committee clearly agreed, and the first two 
recommendations resulting from the majority report of the JSCEM inquiry into the 2010 
election were that the CEA should be amended to allow the AEC to directly update and 
directly enrol eligible persons based on data or information provided to an agency 
approved by the AEC (JSCEM 2011). 
On 23 June 2012 the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Protecting Elector 
Participation) Bill 2012 and the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining 
Address) Bill 2011 were passed by the Senate. These bills respectively allow the AEC to 
directly enrol and directly update eligible electors. At the time of writing the AEC was in 
the process of developing its direct update and enrolment systems. 
What are direct enrolment and direct update? 
This report discusses systems by which electoral management bodies (EMBs) can use 
administrative data from other agencies to enrol an individual or update the details of an 
already enrolled elector without the intervention of that individual. At present, such 
systems are in operation in Victoria and NSW at the state level. The NSW Electoral 
Commission has adopted the term “SmartRoll” as the branding of their system; the 
Victorian equivalent is not branded.  
The best practical guide to what direct enrolment and direct update involve comes from 
existing programs in place in NSW and Victoria. The NSW and Victorian models of direct 
enrolment and direct update allow the Electoral Commissioner to enrol eligible electors 
and update their details when these details change at the Electoral Commissioner’s 
initiative. In practice, the electoral management body receives data from other agencies, 
including vehicle registration and licencing authorities and other bodies such as utilities 
and higher education authorities. These data are subjected to predefined business rules 
to determine their validity, with suitably trustworthy and verified data then prompting 
processes to add eligible individuals to the roll, or change the enrolment information of 
those already on the roll, without the intervention of the individual. The individual is then 
notified of their enrolment or enrolment change, and given the opportunity to dispute that 
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change. If no objection is received, the roll is updated with the new information by the 
commission and the elector is notified to that effect.  
In much of the discussion of these systems they are referred to as “automatic enrolment” 
programs. For example, the NSW enabling legislation, the Parliamentary Electorates and 
Elections Amendment (Automatic Enrolment) Bill 2009, explicitly labels the approach as 
automatic enrolment. While the Victorian legislation doesn’t explicitly name the approach, 
the description of the legislation on the VEC web site refers to the amendment as 
implementing “automatic enrolment” (VEC nd), as does the Victorian Electoral Matters 
Committee (2012). Brent and Hoffman (2011) also collectively term these approaches, 
including some international approaches, as “automatic enrolment”.  
“Automatic enrolment” has become the default way of referring to these systems, despite 
the fact they are also used to update electors’ enrolment details. It is a convenient, if 
somewhat misleading, shorthand to refer to what we will show is a collection of 
approaches that are more similar in terms of outcome than process. Notwithstanding this, 
the preferred terminology used by the AEC is “direct enrolment and direct update”.  
In its Second Supplementary Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters on the Conduct of the 2010 Federal Election, the AEC (2011b) outlined its 
preferred definition: 
In the following discussion, the term ‘direct’ is used to indicate actions initiated by 
the AEC rather than actions initiated by an elector. ‘Enrolment’ refers to 
transactions where a person is enrolling for the first time (and re-enrolling after a 
hiatus where there is no current record), whereas ‘update’ refers to updating an 
elector’s address details for an existing enrolment. For these purposes a change in 
name is considered a new ‘enrolment’ and not an ‘update’. (p. 3) 
Use of the term “automatic” in relation to enrolment from third-party data may inaccurately 
suggest that the data does not undergo stringent quality assurance and are not checked 
by electoral officials before being used to add an individual to the roll. It conveys an 
undesirable blasé impression about the process. While unwieldy, the phrase “direct 
enrolment and direct update” (DE/U) will be used to refer collectively to these systems.  
Another electoral reform which has in practice been tightly coupled with DE/U is the ability 
to enrol, or change an existing enrolment, on election day at the polling place. Again, the 
systems in place currently in NSW and Victoria are different in practice, but share the 
same putative objective. For convenience, this general approach will be referred to as 
“election day enrolment” (EDE). These systems are also discussed briefly in this paper. 
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Objections to direct enrolment and direct update 
The dissenting report of the JSCEM inquiry into the 2010 election argued against a direct 
update or direct enrolment system being implemented for the federal roll (JSCEM 2011). 
The argument made by Opposition Members and Senators3 in the dissenting report 
focused primarily on a concern for the integrity of the roll. The dissenting report argued 
that other government administrative data are often incorrect and that there cannot be 
sufficient confidence in the data for them to be used to populate the electoral roll. The 
dissenting report claimed a particular danger in using data from state governments, as 
they may be outside the scope of oversight by commonwealth bodies such as the 
Commonwealth Parliament or Auditor-General. The use of direct update and enrolment 
would also eliminate the existing “paper trail” provided by a signed physical enrolment 
form. 
Opposition Members and Senators were also concerned that decisions around which data 
are trusted for the purposes of enrolment would inadvertently politicise the AEC, and 
stated that maintaining a correct enrolment is not an unduly onerous obligation for 
Australian citizens. Similar arguments were made in the dissenting report into the JSCEM 
(2010) inquiry into the NSW Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment 
(Automatic Enrolment) Bill 2009. Objections to direct enrolment and direct update are not 
along strictly partisan lines, however, with the Electoral Matters Committee of the Coalition 
Victorian government recommended that the VEC expand their direct enrolment and 
direct update program (EMC 2012). 
These concerns highlight the importance of selecting reliable sources of data and 
scrupulously validating information before it is used to inform the roll. Operating direct 
enrolment and update in the most transparent manner possible will be essential for 
anticipating and managing claims of unfairness or partisanship.  
What do we know about direct enrolment 
and update? 
Direct update and direct enrolment systems have been used by the NSW and Victorian 
electoral commissions, to some extent, over a period of time with each covering at least 
one state election. There is a small body of knowledge in the public domain about the 
operation of these systems so far, which is outlined below.  
                                               
3 The Hon Bronwyn Bishop MP, the Hon Alex Somlyay MP, Senator Scott Ryan and Senator 
Simon Birmingham. 
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NSW 
In 2009 the NSW Parliament passed the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections 
Amendment (Automatic Enrolment) Act 2009, authorising the use of what the NSW 
Electoral Commission calls “SmartRoll”. According to the NSWEC (2009), SmartRoll: 
will minimise the need to complete and lodge enrolment forms by proposing that 
electors who have changed their address details and notified a NSW agency of 
that change are enrolled at their new address. The elector will be given the 
opportunity to object to that proposed enrolment but, if there is no objection, it is 
proposed that the elector is then notified of their formal enrolment. 
Under SmartRoll, voters are added to the roll on the basis of change of address data 
sourced from the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), the NSW Board of Studies 
(BoS) and the NSW First Home Owner Grant Scheme4 (Beeren 2011). Electors are 
notified in writing that they are to be added to the roll, including by SMS and email, and 
are given at least seven days to inform the NSWEC that the changes are incorrect. The 
amendment also allows for election day enrolment, where electors who discover they are 
not enrolled, or that they are enrolled at the wrong address, are able to enrol before 6pm 
on election day and still have their vote counted. 
As at 22 June 2011, a total of 55 405 potential electors had been processed through 
SmartRoll, with 96.4 per cent of these persons subsequently being enrolled. Two thirds of 
these early transactions were based on RTA change of address data, with 20 per cent 
from the BoS and 11 per cent from the First Home Owner Grant Scheme (Beeren 2011). 
By April 2012, 326 768 SmartRoll notices had been sent by the NSWEC, with 86.5 per 
cent resulting in enrolments or enrolment changes. Of these notices, 93.4 per cent were 
triggered by RTA data, with 4.2 per cent from BoS data and 2.3 per cent from the First 
Home Owner Grant Scheme. The vast majority led to changes of enrolment address (82.3 
per cent), with 17.4 per cent being new enrolments.  
Prior to the 2011 NSW state election (26 March 2011) the largest age group of 
SmartRolled electors  were those aged 25 years or under, comprising 37.8 per cent of the 
transactions, both because of new enrolments (31% of the total transactions) and 
because young people more frequently change address. At the time of the state election, 
around 40 000 electors had been SmartRolled. Of those, 19 965 had their address 
changed via SmartRoll, and the turnout rate for this group was 87.5 per cent. The turnout 
rate of the 18 996 first time enrolments was much lower, however, at 64.3 per cent 
(NSWEC 2011). This is consistent with research which indicates that lower levels of 
                                               
4 The NSW Smartroll is maintained as a separate system to the federal roll, and does not attempt 
to capture enrolment changes that are already reflected on the federal roll. This is discussed further 
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turnout amongst young people are common internationally (Quintelier, Hooge & Marien 
2011). 
The CEA does not currently allow the details of the electors on the federal roll to be 
updated on the basis of SmartRoll changes to the NSW roll. The NSWEC sends 
SmartRolled electors commonwealth enrolment forms for these individuals to sign and 
return, however only 12 per cent have so far elected to return them. One consequence of 
direct enrolment and direct update programs being run by the states, particularly NSW’s 
SmartRoll program, is the divergence between the NSW and federal rolls. Election analyst 
Antony Green estimated that, if this trend continued, by the time the next federal election 
is called there will be 200 000 electors enrolled on the NSW roll who are not on the federal 
roll (Green 2011). Many of these NSW electors may have an expectation they are actually 
on the federal roll and thus may unsuccessfully attempt to vote at the next federal 
election. 
Victoria 
The Victorian Electoral Amendment (Electoral Participation) Act 2010 came into operation 
on 20 August 2010, and had not been active for long before the 2010 Victorian state 
election, held on 27 November 2010. The amendment allows the VEC to automatically 
enrol eligible citizens when they turn 18, with these individuals then notified of their 
enrolment and given the opportunity to correct any mistakes. The system began 
implementing direct enrolment almost immediately, but did not start directly updating 
electors until March 2012. 
Currently the system uses information from the Victorian Curriculum and Assessment 
Authority (VCAA) to enrol current and former students when they turn 18. These data are 
sent to Births, Deaths and Marriages (BDM) in order to identify those who were born in 
Victoria before being used for enrolment. The legislation also allows for enrolment at 
polling places on election day.  
According to Mr Steve Tully (2011), Victorian Electoral Commissioner: 
The package of reforms is integrally and intrinsically connected and, in short, 
means that every citizen over the age of 18 in Victoria who attends a voting centre 
in Victoria has the ability to vote. 
If a person were on the roll for a particular address, they were given the vote for 
the corresponding electorate and if they were not on the roll at all, but claimed to 
be eligible, they signed a declaration envelope and either produced prescribed 
proof of their identity or expressly gave permission to have their identity checked 
with the prescribed authority. 
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The VEC directly enrolled approximately 1 800 18-year-olds prior to the 2010 state 
election (held on 27 November 2010). They plan on running the direct enrolment process 
for VCE students in November and December in non-election years (student residence 
records are at their most accurate when students are expecting notification of their year 
12 results).However, because some students had not turned 18 prior to the end of the 
year, and the VEC was unable to send intent to enrol letter until 21 days after they 
become eligible. As a result, approximately 3 000 of the 2011 VCAA-based enrolments 
occurred in January 2012. 
The initial roll-out of the Victorian program focused on enrolments, but in February 2012 
VEC began using VicRoads change of address data to update existing enrolments. 
Approximately 10 000 new enrolments were added based on VicRoads data in each of 
February and May 2012, with another 6 000 in July 2012. In addition, approximately 2 000 
enrolments were updated using VicRoads data each in February, May and July 2012 
(VEC personal communication, 14 August 2012). As at July 2012 the VEC had processed 
around 50 000 transactions under the new system, approximately half of which were new 
enrolments and half enrolment updates.  
The VEC also intends to explore additional data sources. Under their legislation the VEC 
is not able to use data from the AEC for direct enrolment, however the first 
recommendation from the Inquiry into the 2010 Victorian State Election (EMC 2012) 
recommended that the Electoral Act 2002 (Vic) be amended to allow AEC data to be used 
for the purposes of direct enrolment.  
The VEC report that 86 per cent of the directly enrolled electors turned out at the 2010 
state election. None of the 238 directly enrolled electors who did not vote claimed that 
they did not know they were enrolled (EMC 2012).  
Election Day Enrolment 
In Victoria and NSW, election day enrolment (EDE) is seen as an essential part of the 
direct enrolment and update strategy. Election day enrolment provides an opportunity for 
individuals who have been directly enrolled or updated to update incorrect details. It also 
enables individuals who are not affected by direct enrolment and update who attend at a 
voting centre on election day to enrol and vote. This affects the concept of a “close of 
rolls” date. The close of rolls is still an essential part of Victorian electoral administration 
and communications. The VEC emphasizes the need to enrol or update enrolment by the 
close of rolls, and regards election day enrolment as a savings provision to cater for 
people who for whatever reason have failed to either enrol or update their enrolment 
details in time. 
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The Victorian and NSW Consultations 
Mechanics of the systems 
Despite having the common aim of enrolling electors without their intervention, the NSW 
and Victorian DE/U systems are fundamentally different when examined in terms of their 
evolution and processes. These differences have potential implications for the applicability 
of their experience to any federal DE/U system.  
The Victorian DE/U system is arguably more similar to the current federal continual roll 
update (CRU) program and federal DE/U system being developed, at least in terms of the 
underlying mechanics of the system, than it is to the NSW SmartRoll system. Unlike the 
NSWEC, the VEC maintains its own roll, and undertakes its own CRU program. That is, 
the VEC has traditionally been able to add individuals to its own roll due to receiving 
enrolment forms, or object them off the roll if it believes they are no longer living at their 
enrolled address. The Victorian roll is kept synchronised with the Victorian electors on the 
federal roll through the existing joint roll arrangement process, minimising potential roll 
divergence. 
The Victorian DE/U system is an extension of the Victorian roll and CRU process. When 
information becomes available indicating that a citizen is eligible to enrol, rather than 
sending out a notification of the requirement to enrol, as in the current CRU process, the 
citizen is sent notification of the commission’s intention to enrol them. If no response is 
received within a certain timeframe (14 days) that the individual is ineligible to enrol, they 
are enrolled and are notified of their enrolment.  
As the VEC already had a roll system, and the DE/U system was an update to that rather 
than a discrete system of its own, it was relatively inexpensive to develop. Initially the 
VEC’s DE/U system only used VCAA data. It has since been expanded to also use 
VicRoads change of address data and data from the Rental Tenancies Bond Authority. 
Extending the DE/U system to use these additional data was relatively straightforward, 
and the VEC reported that they estimate this expansion cost the VEC under $45 000. 
Although the end result looks the same to the elector, the NSW DE/U system, SmartRoll,  
works in a fundamentally different way to the Victorian system and the federal DE/U 
system being developed. SmartRoll was built from scratch as a dedicated DE/U system, 
and while roll products can be produced from the system, it is based more around a 
customer relationship management (CRM) framework than a roll. The system is based 
around two databases – one which records addresses and one which keeps track of 
individuals (electors and those not eligible to enrol). The two databases are matched in 
order to create roll products for particular purposes. The NSW system was never 
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designed to supplant the AEC’s roll, but rather act as another enrolment channel to 
supplement the AEC’s roll. Unlike the Victorian system it was never intended to be able to 
stand alone as a complete roll.  
In addition to recording enrolment details and status, the database of individuals also 
keeps track of contacts with these individuals. This facility is central to the NSWEC’s 
tracking and management of what it refers to as its “platinum” electors – those who have 
only ever been SmartRolled, who are enrolled but who have never had an elector-initiated  
contact with the NSWEC (platinum electors are discussed in more detail below). It also 
allows an individual to be flagged as being ineligible for enrolment (due to mental state or 
lack of citizenship) without being added to the roll. The system also allows an analysis of 
what categories of potential electors require the most resources to be devoted to them.  
In summary, the key difference between the systems is that the VEC maintains its own 
roll, and uses the federal roll, CRU and DE/U to keep its roll current. The NSWEC, in 
contrast, uses SmartRoll to keep track of changes to enrolment of NSW electors, and 
applies those changes to a current extract of the federal roll when it is required for an 
election. The only list of electors NSWEC maintains itself is those who have been affected 
by SmartRoll (because they have moved or turned 18 since SmartRoll began, for 
instance), whereas the VEC has its own complete roll. In neither case are changes or 
additions to the state DE/U elector databases currently able to be automatically applied to 
the commonwealth roll due to the requirement for a signed enrolment form5, hence 
leading to roll divergence.   
Underlying research and early implementation 
A DE/U system was seen by the VEC as being a logical progression of the existing 
Victorian roll and CRU approach. The state government of the day was approached by the 
VEC about legislation to allow it to directly update and enrol individuals. The legislation, 
when passed, came into operation not long before the 2010 state election (27 November 
2010). Due to the small window before the state election, the initial use of the new powers 
was relatively small scale, and only focused on new enrolments, rather than updates.  
The developmental process of the NSW SmartRoll system was somewhat more 
structured. A description is provided in the NSW Electoral Commissions Report on the 
Conduct of the NSW State Election 2011. Briefly, however, in 2006 the NSW Joint 
Standing Commission on Electoral Matters was interested in ways of increasing 
enrolment, particularly amongst youth and disadvantaged citizens. In 2008 the NSWEC 
conducted a trial at two TAFE campuses to determine how accurately data could identify 
                                               
5 In practice they are added to the roll as “state-only electors” for the respective state and mailed a 
commonwealth enrolment form to complete and return to be added to or updated on the 
commonwealth roll.  
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eligible but unenrolled students and the reactions of the students to the initiative. The 
system was then developed following positive outcomes of the trial and was ready for 
implementation in September 2010, when the enabling legislation was passed.  
Where the initial run of the Victorian system used only one data source (the VCAA school 
enrolment data), with its limited shelf-life6, the NSW system used data from the Board of 
Studies, the Roads and Traffic Authority and the First Home Owners Grant. The NSW 
system started with a small sample of data (with records for only 152 individuals in the first 
two batches). With no problems encountered, the batch numbers were increased to the 
thousands. Typical batches generally now contain 5 000 change of address records, with 
occasional runs of 10 000 records (the largest containing 10 572 records, which resulted 
in a 96 per cent enrolment rate).  
Notification 
Both the Victorian and NSW DE/U systems are predicated on requiring no response from 
the correctly enrolled elector as a default position. When individuals are identified as 
requiring enrolment or a change to their enrolment they are contacted by the electoral 
commission and notified that the commission intends to enrol or update the individual. If 
the individual is happy that the commission’s intended actions are correct, they do not 
have to take action. If the intended actions of the commission are incorrect (for example, 
they are not an Australian citizen, are not eligible to vote due to mental incapacity, or have 
not moved), the individual must contact the commission to inform them.  
Both systems allow contact with individuals via means other than the traditional paper 
postal letter – specifically SMS (Short Message System) and email. Currently only NSW is 
using these alternative forms of contact, while the VEC is sending paper letters. The 
electronic communications means are used in a fall-back manner. If a mobile phone 
number is present, an SMS is sent. If the SMS bounces, or a mobile number is not 
supplied, an email message is sent. If the email isn’t able to be delivered, a traditional 
paper letter is sent. Due to the “opt-in” nature of the system, there is no requirement for 
the individual to post back a response. This approach has the added advantage of 
removing costs for return postage. An individual who believes they are being enrolled or 
updated in error can email or phone the commission to correct their details. Each of the 
commissions has a small call centre dedicated to DE/U queries.  Importantly, the 
individual is only required to respond if their address is incorrect or they are not entitled to 
be enrolled.  
The NSW experience so far is that 19.5 per cent of initial communications have been by 
SMS, with 24.7 per cent by email and the remainder (55.8 per cent) by post, with only a 
                                               
6 That is, the address detail in the VCAA data may be much less accurate once the school year has 
finished. 
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small number of the SMS and email messages bounced back. The email addresses and 
mobile phone numbers are obtained from the external data sources (RTA and Board of 
Studies).  
The use of electronic communication is viewed as an important component in keeping the 
costs of the system down, postage being a major expense for electoral commissions. Both 
states have outsourced their communications (electronic and paper-based) to third-party 
providers. The currency of the electronic contact information is a potential issue. Email 
and mobile phone use and physical mobility vary between different demographic groups, 
and are likely to be particularly changeable amongst young people (ACMA 2011).  
Voter communication, engagement and reactions 
In both Victoria and NSW the public communication about the changes to enrolment were 
deliberately low-key and minimal. Both state electoral commissions made public 
announcements about the changes in the form of media releases, which received little 
media interest. The commissions have not made any concerted efforts to tell the general 
public about the changes, their communications strategy being primarily targeted at those 
who have been affected.  
In Victoria there was effectively no dedicated communication strategy around DE/U and 
election day enrolment (EDE). The reforms were put in place only shortly before the 
election; only a small number of individuals were affected by the DE/U program, and these 
had been individually notified through the standard post-DE/U notifications.  
Both commissions primarily use their DE/U notifications in order to inform individuals 
about the system. The NSWEC directs individuals to their web site at http://smartroll.info 
through their voter communications, whereas the VEC has a more detailed letter 
regarding DE/U, including where the data came from and contact details for enrolment 
objections.  
The NSWEC has deliberately adopted a policy that the less contact that is required from 
SmartRolled electors the better. Under this policy SmartRolled electors only have to 
contact the NSWEC if their details are incorrect – no contact is required if the elector is 
correctly enrolled (as is also the case in the Victorian system). They have a deliberately 
small call centre devoted to SmartRoll (four staff) and are therefore sensitive to any 
increase in enquiries which may indicate increasing levels of data matching errors. In 
practice, the NSWEC has fielded enquiries about election events from SmartRolled voters 
to their SmartRoll call centre (as opposed to the regular NSWEC call centres). This 
suggests that SmartRolled electors have noted the specific SmartRoll contact information 
from their enrolment materials. Both Victoria and NSW also have the capacity to respond 
to enquiries electronically, and emphasise these electronic options to electors.  
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In both NSW and Victoria, identified potential electors are sent a letter through the postal 
service confirming their enrolment after the grace period for objection has expired and 
they have been enrolled. In NSW this letter is explicitly seen as being part of their elector 
engagement process. There are also efforts made to contact and engage with 
SmartRolled electors and to gauge the attitudes and experiences of the electors, although 
this is constrained by the available resources.  
Election Day Enrolment 
Both electoral commissions viewed election day enrolment (EDE) as a “safety net” for 
unenrolled and incorrectly enrolled individuals. If an individual had been incorrectly 
enrolled (either through the DE/U system or otherwise), they are still able to correct their 
enrolment at the polling place, and hence not be disenfranchised. While EDE is arguably 
a valuable addition to an electoral system’s repertoire in itself, it was introduced in both 
Victoria and NSW in conjunction with DE/U legislation and will therefore also be discussed 
in this report. 
The VEC emphasises that any eligible voter who attends a polling place on election day is 
able to cast a vote that would be entered into the scrutiny. While they do not place quite 
the same emphasis, the NSWEC also agreed that is also true of their approach. There 
are, however, subtle differences between how the states carry this out. 
The most significant difference is that, in Victoria, a voter who is enrolled at an address 
other than their current address will have their vote cast for the division in which they are 
enrolled, and is then given an opportunity to change their enrolled address (ie., if they 
have moved to a different division, their vote will be cast for their enrolled division, not 
their new division). In NSW a voter attending a polling place on election day would be able 
to change their enrolled address and have their vote cast for the division associated with 
their new address. In practice, however, it is likely that some NSW electors have had their 
vote recorded at their old address (and previous division) rather than their current address 
(and current division). 
Due to the federal election being held only three months before the Victorian state 
election, many voters were already correctly enrolled and the potential scale of the added 
workload associated with EDE was not apparent. The VEC expects that around 60 000 
EDE transactions would occur in state elections, but only had around 30 000 at the 2010 
state election. The experience of the NSWEC, however, suggests that EDE is resource 
intensive at polling places.  
Data sources 
The core data sources for both the Victorian and NSW DE/U systems are the databases 
of year 12 students from the relevant state educational assessment authorities (VCAA in 
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Victoria and the Board of Studies in NSW) and motor vehicle licencing authorities 
(VicRoads in Victoria and the RTA in NSW). The year 12 students databases are 
particularly useful in terms of new enrolments of eligible citizens aged 18 years, and motor 
vehicle licence database are particularly attractive in terms of changes of address. Both 
state commissions also use data from the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (BDM) 
in order to determine citizenship and to also identify people who are deceased to remove 
from the roll. While the VEC are not currently using the VicRoads data for DE/U purposes, 
the data is being used for their CRU program, and it will be used for DE/U in the near 
future.  
A small number of other supplementary data sources are also being used or considered. 
These include the Rental Tenancies Bond Authority (RTBA) and Victorian Tertiary 
Admissions Centre (VTAC) in Victoria and the First Home Owners Grant Scheme in NSW. 
There is interest amongst the commissions for other data, such as changes of address 
from utility companies, although no avenues currently exist for including these data.  
Both state electoral commissions have a set of “business rules” that are used in order to 
determine the consistency of the data. While developed independently by the NSWEC 
and VEC, there have been recent moves toward increasing the consistency of these rules. 
The VEC emphasises that their legislation specified that they use trusted processes for 
filtering the data, rather than trusted data or trusted agencies.  
The NSWEC receives drivers’ license change of address data nightly and imports it into 
the system daily, although the data is not used to update enrolments for 30 days after it is 
received. The system process batches of cases. It could, however, continually import the 
data and update elector details. Processing the data in suitable batches is an 
administrative decision, rather than an inherent feature of the system. By April 2012 most 
(93 per cent) of the SmartRoll enrolments came from RTA data, with the BoS data 
comprising 4.3 per cent and the First Home Owner’s Grant 2.3 per cent of enrolments.  
Although the VEC had not (at the time of the consultations) started using the VicRoads 
change of address data for direct enrolment, they had undertaken initial trials to determine 
the scope of the exercise. Of approximately 35 000 cases in the data, 18 700 were 
matched by the business rules as suitable for direct enrolment (a “hit rate” of around 50 
per cent). The VEC started using VicRoads change of address data for updates in 
February 2012 and record that 61 per cent in July 2012 resulted in enrolments. 
Interestingly 12 per cent of those contacted with an intent letter are recorded as 
“subsequently enrolled”. In most cases this means they contacted the AEC to update their 
enrolment after having received the letter but before they could be processed by the 
VEC’s direct enrolment and direct update program.  
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Special enrolments 
Both Victoria and NSW use the same protocol with silent electors. Any elector residing at 
the same address as a currently silently enrolled elector is also considered a silent, and is 
not directly enrolled or updated. The NSWEC and the AEC jointly reached an agreement 
that this approach would be appropriate, and the VEC came to the same conclusion 
independently. 
For persons ineligible to enrol due to intellectual disability or other mental conditions the 
situation is less straightforward. On the whole, these individuals cannot be identified on 
the basis of the data received by the electoral commissions. It is possible that excluding 
records from schools which specifically cater to intellectually disabled students from direct 
enrolment might go some way toward addressing this issue, but the range of disabilities 
catered to by such schools will likely vary, and will not necessarily align with the 
expectations of the CEA. It is also likely that students who are unable to vote due to 
intellectual disability cannot be identified in this way. In practice, the NSW and Victorian 
electoral commissions rely on parents of intellectually disabled persons contacting the 
commission in response to DE/U notifications.  
Australian citizenship 
Both the NSW and Victorian electoral commissions have access to state Births, Deaths 
and Marriages (BDM) data and have in the past used that data to determine citizenship. A 
potential elector identified as having been born in the state was used as a proxy for 
citizenship. 
The method of access of the data varied depending on the state. In NSW an extract of all 
births in the state for the past hundred years has been obtained from BDM, along with 
regular extracts of deaths data. In Victoria the list of potentially eligible electors was sent 
to BDM to filter out those who were not born in Victoria (or who have since died).  
Both states faced the issue of directly enrolling individuals who were born in Australia and 
are still in Australia at the age of 18, but who are not Australian citizens. The largest group 
of these is likely to be children born to New Zealand citizens who live in Australia, 
although the actual number of these is not known (and is not expected to be large). The 
VEC also checks the birthplace of the individual’s parents in order to identify and exclude 
such people.  
It was anticipated by the respective commissions that those individuals who are notified 
they will be directly enrolled who are not Australian citizens will contact the commission to 
report they are not eligible to be enrolled. Since 2012, however, the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has agreed for the AEC to supply DIAC data on 
citizenship status to the state commissions. As DIAC will not necessarily have information 
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on Australian-born Australian citizens, BDM data is still an important means of verifying 
citizenship. 
Finding “the missing” 
Analysis conducted by the NSWEC on the SmartRolled electors prior to the Clarence by-
election (19 November 2011) indicated that approximately 4 per cent of those added to 
the roll were new enrolments (“new news”, as opposed to reinstated enrolments). At this 
point, the number of these electors who voted is not known. Overall, 17.4 per cent of 
electors who have been SmartRolled since the inception of the system are new 
enrolments. 
Electors not on the roll are essentially absent for either passive or active reasons. The 
passive missing are those who have not enrolled due to disinterest, apathy, or simply not 
having got around to enrolling or updating their details. The passive missing are unlikely to 
object to DE/U enrolment. The active missing, in contrast, are those who have a 
philosophical or ideological objection to enrolment and/or voting, and refuse to be 
enrolled. With the exception of a trial carried out recently by the VEC to prosecute non-
enrollers, Australian electoral authorities have traditionally not vigorously pursued the 
active missing. The details of at least some of the active missing, however, will be 
captured in DE/U programs (some of them will manage to stay “off the radar” sufficiently 
to avoid being included in DE/U data).  
The NSWEC estimated during the consultations it will take four to five years of SmartRoll 
operation to make serious inroads into the number of missing electors in NSW. This 
estimate, based on the estimated number of missing electors and the number of 
transactions undertaken by SmartRoll, may prove to be overly-optimistic. Due to the 
design of SmartRoll, electors who have limited contact with the utilised data sources (eg., 
non-year 12 completers, electors without drivers licenses) are unlikely to be picked up by 
SmartRoll.  
Due to the short implementation lifetime of the Victorian DE/U system (at the time of 
investigation) it is too early to draw any firm conclusions on how successfully it identified 
and enrolled missing electors. The VEC reports that 31 per cent of persons identified from 
the Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority data were not enrolled. It is likely that 
at least some of these people would have enrolled at the next enrolment trigger such as 
an election event. Analysis of the results of more datasets being processed through the 
DE/U system will provide a better indication of the number of missing being enrolled.   
Knock-on effects 
The implementation of DE/U has so far been limited to only a small proportion of electors 
and only one state election in each of Victoria and NSW. The full extent of any “knock-on” 
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effects of these programs may not be apparent for some time. It is too soon to say 
whether electorally disengaged electors who are directly enrolled are more likely to vote 
informally, or to not attend at a polling place, for example. Certain knock-on effects are, 
however, being anticipated and planned for. 
One significant example is the NSW future commitment to SmartRolled electors. The 
NSWEC believes, not unreasonably, that electors who have been enrolled or had their 
details updated by SmartRoll will have little or no motivation to manually update their 
details in the future, regardless of their legal obligations. The electoral commission is 
therefore obligated to continue to monitor these electors and update their details (and 
communicate the update to the elector) when necessary. In practical terms, these electors 
have been freed of the obligation to maintain their own enrolment.  
The NSWEC divides its SmartRolled electors into the “gold” and “platinum” groups. The 
gold group will have filled out an enrolment form at some point in their lives, but are now 
having their details updated automatically by the electoral commission. The platinum 
group have been directly enrolled, and can expect to be directly updated in the future. 
These are the electors who have never filled out an enrolment form. It is expected that the 
experience of being SmartRolled will change their future enrolment behaviour, leaving 
them unlikely to manually update their enrolment.  
It is difficult to say what constitutes a good turnout when it comes to direct enrolments, as 
direct enrolment mainly affects young people, who historically have low levels of turnout. 
Some proportion of those directly enrolled may also be electorally disengaged, and 
therefore less likely to both enrol and vote. With these provisos in mind, both commissions 
report relatively high levels of DE/U electors voting at subsequent elections. In NSW 77.2 
per cent of SmartRolled electors voted at the 2011 state election, with 64.3 of the newly 
enrolled electors voting. In Victoria 79.8 per cent of directly enrolled electors voted at the 
2010 state election. Although difficult to quantify, again because of the traditionally low 
turnout of young people, it also suggests that the DE/U programs are resulting in correct 
enrolments. The results are on the basis of small, but not necessarily unrepresentative, 
samples of the entire electorate, and are a promising indication of the potential success of 
DE/U systems.  
Political environment 
While Australian election management bodies are determinedly apolitical, they operate in 
a highly politicised environment. It is interesting, therefore, to note that in both NSW and 
Victoria the DE/U legislation was passed by Labor state governments, both of whom then 
lost power to Liberal/National Coalitions in the first election for which the DE/U systems 
operated. In both cases the electoral commissions had received no indication that the 
incoming government was unhappy with the DE/U system or wished to shut them down. 
 Page 22    Direct Update and Direct Enrolment | The Australian Experience  
Under its new government, for example, the Victorian Electoral Matters Committee made 
recommendations7 consistent with the continuing operation of direct enrolment and direct 
update in Victoria (EMC 2012). This is no guarantee that a new government will not, at 
some point, require the system to be changed or repealed. The dissenting reports from 
several commonwealth JSCEM hearings regarding direct enrolment and direct update 
indicate some reservations about the process from several federal Coalition MPs and 
Senators. However the state experience indicates at least some level of comfort with 
DE/U systems by both major political parties at a state level.  
Cost 
The respective DE/U systems required substantially different financial outlays, largely 
because the NSW system was developed from the ground up as a new system whereas 
the Victorian system was a relatively minor enhancement to an existing system. The 
NSWEC reports that it received $1.2 million from the state government to implement the 
system and enrol the first batch of new electors. The initial seed funding was rolled over 
into the continuing program. Ongoing costs of the NSW system mainly consist of the six 
personnel who continue to maintain the system, including four call centre staff. The actual 
cost of the Victorian program is not known, but is reported to be considerably lower.  
A significant cost-saving of the DE/U systems is the reduced requirement to contact 
electors through the postal service. Even in Victoria, where the communication is still 
paper-based, there is a significantly reduced postage cost because most electors do not 
need to send back a form (thus avoiding return postage costs). In the NSW system this 
has been further reduced through the use of non-paper based communications. It is not 
known exactly what the postage savings from these initiatives are at this point, however 
postage costs have always been a significant expense for EMBs.  
In addition to the system establishment costs associated with DE/U, there is also likely to 
be an additional cost in terms of adequately resourcing EDE. At this point it is not possible 
to gauge how much widespread use of EDE by electors would cost. In theory EDE should 
only need to be used for a small proportion of eligible persons for whom DE/U has not 
resulted in an accurate enrolment, but that theory has not been adequately tested. The 
quantum of that extra funding is yet to be determined.  
Roll integrity 
Roll integrity is not a simple concept to quantify. It has been defined by the AEC as 
consisting of five elements (AEC 2012, 3): 
                                               
7 Recommendation 3.1 recommended that the Electoral Act 2002 (Vic) be amended to allow 
enrolments from the AEC that have not be witnessed be allowed to be used for the purposes of 
direct enrolment and direct update in Victoria. 
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■ Entitlement – the individual meets all legislative qualifications for enrolment on the 
electoral roll, information provided by individuals is tested to detect and prevent 
enrolment fraud. 
■ Accuracy – the individual is enrolled for the address at which they are entitled. 
■ Completeness – all individuals who are entitled to enrolment are enrolled. 
■ Processing correctness – information provided by individuals and organisations is 
entered correctly and completely on the roll, addresses are correctly and 
completely described, classified and aligned. 
■ Security – the electoral roll is protected from unauthorised access and tampering.   
The five-element definition of roll integrity adopted by the AEC follows the four-element 
definition of roll integrity proposed by the Australian National Audit Office for its audit of 
the integrity of the roll (ANAO 2002). The main differences between the ANAO and AEC 
definitions is that the AEC has replaced validity (“the electoral roll includes all individuals 
who are eligible to enrol”, ANAO 2002, 10) with the more inclusive element of entitlement. 
The AEC also added “processing correctness”, reflecting the AEC’s awareness of the 
importance of the data that forms part of the system, particularly through the CRU 
process. A similar multi-factorial approach is taken internationally. The International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems has a more expansive global principles for accurate 
electoral rolls which incorporate the AEC’s five elements (Yard 2011).  
In additional to composing multiple different elements, in practical terms roll integrity is a 
relative measure. That is, a given process may lead to greater or lesser roll integrity in 
terms of any or each of the five elements.  
A full discussion of assessment of roll integrity is beyond the scope of the current paper, 
however the expressed opinions of the NSW and Victorian commissions was that DE/U 
inevitably leads to greater roll integrity. The process increases the accuracy and 
completeness of the information contained in the electoral roll well beyond what CRU is 
able to achieve. It uses fundamentally the same data as CRU, however, so entitlement, 
processing correctness and security are not compromised. Additionally, the states believe 
their DE/U processes contain appropriate opportunities for any elector who is incorrectly 
updated to correct those updates, and the existence of EDE mitigates the risk of electors 
being disenfranchised through errors made by the electoral commission. 
Privacy considerations 
Neither of the state commissions reported that they had encountered any significant 
privacy issues, either from privacy authorities or electors, as part of their DE/U programs. 
In practice, the commissions effectively bypass the need for individuals to opt-into the 
DE/U systems, or be notified of the possibility of their information being passed on to the 
electoral commissions, by using the demand powers in their respective legislation to 
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obtain the data. In Victoria the contact letter sent to the enrolled elector notes the source 
of the data and that “a number of organisations are required to provide the VEC with 
information to assist in maintaining the electoral roll”. Clients who engage in transactions 
with the agencies that supply data to the commissions (especially educational assessment 
authorities and motor vehicle license issuing authorities) may not be aware that their 
information may be passed on to the electoral commission.  
Implications for the AEC 
A move to direct enrolment and direct update of the federal roll by the AEC will have a 
substantial impact on AEC operations, and particularly on election, enrolment and 
education functions. Direct enrolment and update will likely be a powerful tool for 
maintaining an accurate and current roll, as part of a broader suite of enrolment 
strategies. The exact scope of the changes to the work of the AEC is difficult to 
comprehensively predict, but may include: 
■ Significant realignment of the roll management workload, potentially “smoothing” 
the workload over the non-election period. 
■ Education campaigns to inform Australian electors of the changes, potentially well 
before the next federal election or lead up to a referendum (when communications 
funding is most readily available), with possible implications for resourcing of 
communications campaigns around turnout and formality. 
■ Retraining and re-tasking of staff at all levels, particularly divisional staff who are 
currently involved in processing enrolments, and polling centre staff for election 
day enrolment. 
■ Substantial implications for joint roll arrangements between the commonwealth 
and the states and territories, possibly leading to legislative change across multiple 
jurisdictions.  
Direct enrolment and direct update are likely to have substantial impacts on the key 
indicators of the voting franchise: participation rate, turnout and formality. The reforms 
primarily target the participation rate, through ensuring as many eligible persons as 
possible are currently enrolled. As such, successfully implementing direct update and 
direct enrolment should improve the participation rate. 
The likely impacts on turnout and formality are more complex, and it is possible that the 
turnout and formality rate may both decrease. Some electors who are directly enrolled and 
updated may have lower levels of electoral engagement, and may either not vote on 
election day or may vote informally (either intentionally or inadvertently). There is a risk 
that negative movement in these measures may be employed as “evidence” that the direct 
enrolment and update process has failed.  
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Worryingly, internal AEC research indicates that a proportion of electors already believe 
they are being automatically enrolled onto the federal roll. As the Victorian and NSW (and 
potentially Queensland) direct enrolment and update processes affect more people—
these states containing well over half of the Australian voting population—this proportion 
will inevitably grow. Maintaining all possible consistency between state and federal 
enrolment processes will reduce elector confusion and may increase confidence in the 
electoral process. 
Conclusion 
The convergent evolution of direct enrolment and direct update in Victoria and NSW 
reflects different approaches to addressing a common problem: the decline in the 
enrolment rate. DE/U was viewed by the electoral commissions as a logical extension to 
the common approach of the data-driven CRU process, removing only the need for the 
elector to actively respond in most cases. With the increasing desire of citizens to transact 
with government services online (AGIMO 2011), it removes what is seen by electors and 
potential electors as an anachronistic step in the process of enrolment.  
Due to the long history of CRU, a system which was developed jointly between the state 
and territory electoral commissions and the AEC, the data used for DE/U is well 
understood. As such, from the perspective of the commissions, the risk of DE/U to the 
integrity of the roll is seen as being low. Concerns from parliamentary stakeholders 
regarding roll integrity are important for the commissions to address, and as such an 
evidence base should be developed by the commissions to assuage these fears. While 
large-scale habitation reviews are infeasible, processes along the lines of the Sample 
Audit Fieldwork can be used to verify the accuracy of enrolments resulting from DE/U. 
In an environment of compulsory enrolment, the state has an obligation to make 
enrolment as easy as possible for electors, while still ensuring that those who are enrolled 
meet the requirements for enrolment. If the state, via the electoral commissions, is able to 
accurately enrol individuals without the individual’s intervention, then it appears self-
evident that it should do so.  
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Appendix 1: Questions addressed in 
consultations 
Operation Issues 
■ How are the direct enrolment and direct update programs progressing? 
– How many electors have been direct enrolled or direct updated in what 
time period? 
– How many electors per year will be affected by the system when it is fully 
operational? 
■ What is the deployment strategy? Which groups of electors are being added first 
and which are planned for later evolutions of the process?  
■ What processes are in place for investigating electors for whom the data are 
inconsistent and cannot be used to directly enrol those electors, and how 
successful have those processes been at getting the elector onto the roll? 
■ How long does it take, on average, to get any given elector onto the roll with direct 
update and direct enrolment? 
■ Are there any current statistics about number of SmartRolled electors who also 
change their federal enrolment? 
■ How do you deal with silent electors and electors not capable of voting due to 
mental impairment? 
– How do they ascertain which of the various addresses associated with an 
elector is their residential address for voting purposes? 
■ How many directly enrolled/updated electors did not vote at the subsequent 
election? 
– How many reported that they did not know they were enrolled? 
■ Has there been any measurable relationship between direct enrolment/update and 
informality? 
■ What research has been undertaken at the state level to both support the 
introduction of direct update and enrolment, and to ensure that it is operating 
optimally?  
– What research was done pre-implementation to support the legislative 
change? 
– What was involved in making the business case? 
– What post implementation research is being conducted or planned? 
Impacts 
■ How are direct update and direct enrolment impacting on measures of democratic 
heath (participation rate, turnout and formality)? 
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■ What effects have direct enrolment had on the integrity of the roll and how have 
this been measured? 
– How many notifications have you received back that people have been 
incorrectly enrolled? 
– Have you done any independent verification of the data used to enrol 
electors? 
■ What are the likely knock-on effects of direct update and direct enrolment to other 
processes (such as non- and multi-voter processing, declaration vote workloads 
etc)? 
– Have any of these been measured/quantified so far? 
■ Have the costs (so far) been within the expected range? 
Problems 
■ What problems have the NSWEC and VEC encountered with their direct 
enrolment and direct update programs generally and how have they addressed 
them? 
■ Have any electors complained about being included on the roll? How have these 
been handled? 
■ What are the numbers of SmartRoll forms which have been returned to sender? 
■ What negotiations with what authorities had to take place in order to comply with 
privacy requirements in using the data for enrolments? 
Data issues 
■ Do the agencies supplying data need to disclose to the elector that the data is 
being shared with the AEC for the purposes of enrolment? 
■ What processes are useful for assessing the quality or utility of data sources? 
■ Are there any issues with the data sources, and if so, what are those issues and 
how are they being addressed? 
■ What other data sources may be used, or are planned? 
■ How old is the data that is used?  
■ What processes do you have for monitoring changes to the quality, composition, or 
definitions of the data in the source agency? 
Communication 
■ What do people who have been directly enrolled or updated understand about the 
process? What are their concerns (inability to opt out, privacy, etc)? 
– Have you received any feedback from these electors (positive or 
negative)? 
– Has there been any press attention (positive or negative)? 
 Page 31    Direct Update and Direct Enrolment | The Australian Experience  
■ Has there been any feedback from electors about confusion between state and 
federal enrolment and their require to enrol federally separately? 
■ What communication strategies have been employed to communicate direct 
enrolment to the electors and how successful have these been? 
– Is there a perception that the existence of direct enrolment makes it less 
necessary to run enrolment communication campaigns? 
■ What strategies have been employed to educate elusive electors and how 
successful have these been? 
Other research 
■ What sorts of questions are most important to ask electors in the opinion research 
in the later stages of the project? 
– Comparisons in awareness between electors who have been SmartRolled 
and others? 
– Awareness of the state/commonwealth enrolment issues? 
– Are we able to survey affected electors (are there any privacy concerns)? 
– Do we need to undertake any focus group style research? 
 
